Said's addressees in this book were not primarily third-world intellectuals, to whom his concern was evident enough, but intellectuals in Europe and North America, many of them self-proclaimed custodians of the project of modernity and Enlightenment. Said reminded them that they, too, were heirs of a colonial legacy. A full understanding of their scientific and cultural traditions, national cultures and academic disciplines required awareness and knowledge of the imperial system that had set their culture of modernity in place. It was therefore all the more remarkable, Said charged, that a vast majority of European intellectuals carried on as though their focus areas were located outside and beyond the economic, political and cultural connections that had once united the world into a single interacting whole as never before in history (Said 1993, 239) . 1 This blindness was in itself part of colonialism's legacy, which had installed an epistemology calibrated to avert intellectuals from identifying the connections between their own scholarly enterprises and history in its widest, imperial and geopolitical sense.
In projecting to a global scale the Benjaminian dictum -'there is no document of culture that is not at the same time a document of barbarism' -Said typically dealt with canonised European literature, historiography, music, art and scholarship. This was to him the area in which the dialectical revelation that documents of high culture are also documents of imperial violence afforded the most precipitous insights, as when the intrinsic links between Giuseppe Verdi's Aida and the construction of the Suez Canal, or between the British realist novel and Caribbean plantation slavery were suddenly laid bare.
That there are intrinsic relations between the political institutions of the West and the history of imperialism was self-evident for Said. While few historians and social scientists would dispute this, they have nonetheless been selective in their choices of which political formations deserve being studied from the perspective offered by the history of imperialism.
This is where Said's work turns out to be instructive in unexpected ways.
For it does not only analyze epistemologies -most notably one called Orientalism -that, evolving in tandem with imperial power, have moulded Western and non-Western experience while at the same time marginalising and silencing crucial aspects of reality; it also provides elements for a sociology of knowledge which enables a systematic understanding of the processes by which academic institutions, schools of learning and groups of intellectuals have been formed and have gained their insights and reputations at the cost of such silencing and marginalisation. In this essay, our primary object is scholarship on the European Union, but our argument also pertains to historical and sociological research on European colonialism more generally, which in adapting itself to inherited epistemological preconceptions has failed to recognise historical circumstances and relations that are crucial for an understanding of how colonialism has influenced the European integration process as well as postcolonial Africa.
1.
For a long time, studies of imperialism focused primarily on once colonised societies where the traces and consequences of imperialism lay immediately open to anyone's experience. As a result of Said's and other postcolonial critics' argument that colonising societies were just as much influenced by imperialism as the colonised ones, there has in recent decades also emerged an impressive body of research that traces colonialism's influence on the national cultures and histories of a number of European states, and not just those that had explicit imperial ambitions. Examples are too numerous to mention, especially if we add research that has gone to great length in demonstrating how the colonial legacy links up with contemporary struggles over national identity, migration, domestic ethnic and racial relations, but also as concerns the former colonial powers' current geopolitical interests. As such, this research testifies to the fact that colonialism lingers on as a touchy and salient issue in national imaginaries and cultural identities, as well as in national high politics. Concerning the ways in which colonialism has affected European culture in general and the history of Europe's various nation states there is, in sum, a body of knowledge that is expanding by the day.
Meanwhile, the urgency of a series of contemporary issues and projects should challenge research also to go beyond the methodological nationalism often inherent in such studies on colonialism. We will deal with one such area in which the role and influence of the colonial system is understudied and argue that this failure is a consequence of falling outside dominant epistemological frames of reference. with a 'fruitless' yet revealing speculation as to 'how much more smoothly European unification in its first decisive stage would have proceeded if the almost total loss of empire had occurred, and had been seen to occur, at the same time as all the other losses arising from the Second World War, instead of taking a further fifteen years to complete' (Lipgens 1982, 12-13) . Such a framing thus effectively eliminates the possibility of the converse relation, where empire also created an incentive for European integration.
As a consequence of such accounts, Europe as an intergovernmental and supranational political project and entity has been placed outside and beyond the history of colonialism.
There is a near perfect fit between such scholarly accounts of the EU's history and the portrait in which the EU likes to mirror itself. Indeed, the EU of today endeavours to ground its We contend that this interpretation fulfils its foremost function as a myth, a foundational tale of origins, of an Immaculate Conception, which sets in place the main elements of a wishful and idealised European identity. As Mark Gilbert has observed in the more narrow context of EU-studies, this field has yet to cast off its dominant 'whiggish' approach (Gilbert 2008) , too often positing European integration as imbued with a noble cause and benevolent historical purpose, much like nationalist intellectuals' refusal in earlier periods to critically scrutinize the historical origins of national projects. There is a danger involved in this replacement of history by myth. We will then be educating students and the general public to think of the European project in the least European way thinkable, namely, as unrelated to the imperialist project that is, in fact, one of Europe's major histories.
However, if this version of history is feeble and mythicising, what explains its success? Let us answer this question in two steps. First, it is necessary to back up our claim that Europe as a political formation and subject in the form of the EU is not merely related to the history of colonialism but to no little extent determined by it. Second, we will suggest some factors that explain why the relation between the EU and colonialism has been systematically neglected.
Here we will seek to identify the operations of a colonial epistemology that has facilitated a misrecognition of what postwar European integration was about. As the article argues, this epistemology has enabled colonialism's historical relation to the European integration project to remain undetected and has thus also reproduced within the present EU precisely those colonial or neo-colonial preconceptions that the European partner states, in official discourse and policy, falsely claim that they have abandoned.
2.
The interconnection between the history of colonialism and the history of European integration is best exposed by a compelling geopolitical figure once known as Eurafrica. As we have shown elsewhere, early efforts to unify Europe -in the period from, say, 1920 to 1960 -systematically coincided with efforts to stabilise the colonial system in Africa (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011; 2013) . In principle, the demand for inclusion of the overseas territories should be welcomed.
Since many years and in numerous European organisations, as in the Council of Europe and the OEEC, plans have been worked out which have had as their aim the joint exploitation of the overseas territories by the European states. Until now the realisation of this has failed […] . Within the frame of the Schuman Plan it also did not succeed to push through the inclusion of the overseas territories in the European Coal and Steel
Community. However, in all these negotiations no doubts were ever expressed, from the perspective of the majority of the European states, and especially from the perspective of the Bundesrepublik, that the joint inclusion of the overseas territories is desirable.
Precisely from the German side it has been repeatedly complained that the Schuman Plan did not provide for the inclusion of the overseas territories. The significance of this persistent demand of the European states and especially also of the Bundesrepublik has in no way been diminished by the most recent events in world politics. There can remain no doubt that a conflict is emerging over the overseas territories, especially the African territories, between on the one hand the communist states and on the other hand the western community of states. The outcome of this conflict will have a great, if not decisive importance as concerns the future constellation of power in the worldwide context. It follows from all this, that the demand for an inclusion of the overseas territories must not just be accepted, but welcomed (Brentano 1956 ). Further down in the preamble, comparison is made with the Marshall plan for Europe, and it is asserted that the association of the overseas territories should be undertaken in the same spirit. The preamble concludes:
This letter shows that although West Germany fought
The proposed enterprise entails consequences of major importance for the future of Europe.
[…] In aiding Africa and supporting itself on her, the community of the six is able to furnish Europe with its equilibrium and a new youth. It is in this perspective that all other elements of information assembled in the present report should be understood.
(Conférence intergouvernmentale, 1956)
Shortly thereafter, Robert Schuman weighed in on the treaty negotiations with a forceful plea for Eurafrican integration that partly echoed the ad-hoc group's report. 'Eurafrica', he asserted, 'does not just signify the creation of a system of assistance; but the constitution of an economic whole, of a true association, in the interior of which a reciprocity of advantages and a communal politics of development will be put to work.' (Schuman 1957a) In words alluding to the Suez crisis, Schuman went on to add Eurafrica's by now much rehearsed geopolitical rationale, arguing that since the Soviet quest for world hegemony had set its eyes on Africa, 'we should respond through the institution of a true community between the peoples of Europe and of Africa, the notion of which is at the basis of the Eurafrican idea' (Schuman 1957b, 21 in Washington DC upon the Eurafrican settlement and thus the conclusion of the treaty negotiations:
I would like to insist upon the unity of Europe: it is now a fact. A few days ago we jumped over the last hurdles that were on its way, and now an even broader unity is being born: EURAFRICA, a close association in which we will work together to promote progress, happiness and democracy in Africa. (Mollet 1957b) 3.
The quoted documents are fragments of a larger discourse that we for lack of space cannot reconstruct in any detail here (for an in-depth account, see Hansen and Jonsson 2014) . It is a discourse that transforms itself into political practice in the EEC, which in the late 1950s and and a 'Eurafrican economic symbiosis' (Lemaignen 1964, 115-60) .
Why has this history of colonialism been consigned to oblivion? Why is it virtually unknown that most of the visions, movements and concrete institutional arrangements working towards European integration in the postwar period placed Africa's incorporation into the European enterprise as a central objective? One reason is that the history of the EU is usually bent to fit Eurocentric presuppositions or even, as we pointed out, has been elaborated into a self-legitimising myth. Another reason is that the histories of Europe and Africa are mostly conceived as endogenous continental narratives. A third one, also mentioned, is that the history of colonialism is typically told as a history of the colonial systems of the colonial/imperial states. If world history and global processes are cut up and edited by such devices, Eurafrica drops out of the picture, because it belongs to a geopolitical constellation that cannot be mapped by way of continental or national categories.
Let us analyze these circumstances in more detail, assuming that they result from misrecognitions enabled by a colonial epistemology of the kind outlined in our introductory section. We mentioned that the history of colonialism is often treated as the sum-total of the colonial systems of various colonial/imperial states. A showcase of this tendency is a recent book entitled L'Europe face à son passé colonial (Europe in the face of its colonial past), which despite its promising title actually does not say a word about Europe and its colonial past. Rather, the book contains the usual inventory of the colonial pasts of France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, etcetera (Dard and Lefeuvre 2008) . Historians of colonialism seem still constrained by the national and linguistic barriers laid in place by the old colonial powers;
and, at best, they compensate for this by engaging in traditional exercises of comparative history that never approach the intergovernmental and supranational levels and logics of European integration.
Having said this, we should also note that there is in fact a growing field of research that is examining the impact of colonialism and decolonisation on historical as well as current notions of Europe and European identity, and which thus highlights that colonialism also needs to be approached as a shared (Western) European experience which in many ways transgresses particular national outlooks. However, this research also suffers from an almost complete lack of engagement with the question of European integration (for an example, see states and regional formations, while at the same time loyally accommodating the economic demands and policies of their former colonial masters. This was to be conducted through arrangements -such as the Yaoundé Convention (signed in 1963), which was EEC's new association regime with, from now on, independent African states -from which both camps would reap huge benefits, at the cost of the majority of Africans for whom decolonisation did not seem to happen or turned out to be 'a non-event', as Achille Mbembe puts it (2010, 58) .
Thus, if the misrecognition that prevents us from relating the EU to colonial history is dispelled, and if the history of Eurafrica is put back into the picture, we understand why decolonisation never constituted a significant rupture with the past -except in states where leaders and movements explicitly tried to break with the colonial rulers. EEC's 'offer' of association to the common market here turned out to be an efficient antidote to PanAfricanism, and this may even be said to have been its true historical purpose: to adjust Europe's foreign policy, modes of economic extraction and means of production to a nominally independent Africa, while ensuring that the continent's resources remained within Enunciations about Africa or interventions in Africa say less about Africa than about European subjects of knowledge being 'prisoners of epistemological frames that only unfold the consequences of their own postulates' (Mudimbe 1974, 93) . In this sense, the history of Eurafrica, as it marks out the intersection of the history of European integration and the history of colonialism, indicates the necessity of perceiving Europe and Africa from the perspective of a truly global history and theory. A couple of decades ago, Africa was written off as a stagnant and uneventful periphery, a black hole in the worldwide web of the network society (Castells 1998, 73) . Today, Africa is extolled as a booming 'continent of the future', to which states, international organisations and transnational companies rush to make profits or secure resources. The history of Eurafrica helps us understand this so-called new scramble for Africa, how it can happen and which stakes are involved. For in order to think theoretically about globality today, it is fundamental to know how the global was conceived in the past, that is, in historical times. Eurafrica was an intellectual endeavor and a political project that from the 1920s saw Europe's future survival -its continued existence in history as a power shaping global history -as totally bound up with Europe's successful merger with Africa. That is, Europe could rise out of the two world wars only in the shape of Eurafrica.
Today, even as the Eurafrican project is largely forgotten, the content of current EU policymaking towards its African 'partner' demonstrates that it has continued influence under the surface; and the only way to comprehend the deep structures of current EU-African relations is to bring this history to life.
But Eurafrica and the colonial history of the EU are of theoretical importance also because they undercut one of the most pernicious features of the geographical and historiographical paradigms that originated in the West. No serious analyst has failed to register that there is a specific historiographical category that imposes itself a priori, as it were, on any description of Africa in the modern world order. This category presents Africa 
